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United States v. La Jeune Eugenic, 26 F. Cas.
832 (C.C.D. Mass. 1822) (No. 15,551), as
believing that the slave trade was in violation of
this naturalist vision of international law. But
just three years later, Story had to endure the
indignity of silently recanting his position as a
member of the Supreme Court ruling in The
Antelope, 23 U.S. (10 Wheat.) 66 (1825). And,
indeed, The Antelope is usually regarded as the
beginning of the "infection" of positivism in the
American approach to the law of nations, what
with Chief Justice Marshall's comment that
[w]hatever might be the answer of a moralist
to this question [the legality of the slave
trade], a jurist must search for its legal
solution, in those principles of action which
are sanctioned by the usages, the national
acts, and the general assent, of that portion
of the world of which he considers himself a
part, and to whose law the appeal is made.
[We must] resort to this standard as the test
of international law ....
Id. at 120-22.. Of course, British courts had
already reached this conclusion. (See The Le
Louis, 165 Eng. Rep. 1464 (Adm. 1817).
Wheaton's Elements, published barely 11
years after The Antelope decision, marks this
contradiction and confluence of natural law and
positive law sources. And, indeed, the earlier
publication of Joseph Story's volume, Conflict
of Laws (in 1834), is a crucial moment in this
story. As ably and humorously explained by
Professor Alan Watson in his book, Joseph Story
and the Comity of Errors: A Case Study in
Conflict of Laws (1992), Story's move to a
territorial basis for resolving conflicts issues
(largely, although erroneously, derived from
Ulrichus Huber) was critical in establishing a
difference between
private and
public
international
law.
Henceforth,
territorial
sovereigns began to regard themselves as
unrestrained by international law to decide such
matters as prescriptive and adjudicatory
jurisdiction.
There is one other figure in this mix of
intellectual sources for nineteenth-century
international law. That is John Austin. Although
Austin's work follows Wheaton's by a few
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decades, his writings reflect the most extreme of
English legal positivism. His renunciation of
international law as not "law" at all, remains a
crippling blow, one that conditions much of the
debate that follows. Wheaton may well have
anticipated the positivist critique and attempted
to blunt it somewhat by recognizing that
international law was - and remains - an
admixture of natural and positive sources for
obligation, of moral restraint and positive
consent.
Wheaton's
American
empirical
pragmatism comes as a welcome diversion from
later English and Continental
positivist
absolutism.
As international law has now experienced a
half-century of a return to balanced naturalist
and positivist outlooks - is that not the entire
thrust of the "human rights revolution"? - it
seems propitious to look back and trace the
intellectual origins of these developments. Far
from being a morality play, a Manichean dr~ima
of conflict between good and evil sources of
international legal obligation, the tension
between natural law and positive law is more of
a yin and yang, a mystic relationship that
mutually nourishes and annihilates the other.
Henry Wheaton embodied a rare combination of
those impulses. His example as a scholar,
diplomat and lawyer should continue to inspire,
if not periodically perplex, us.
David J. Bederman
Emory University

THE ELEMENTS OF INTERNATIONAL LAW

Henry Wheaton is the Blackstone of
international law. By giving lawyers a simple,
clear and convincing description of international
law, as he understood it, Wheaton shaped the
law of nations for his contemporaries, and their
successors for at least half a century after his
death. Wheaton's Elements of International
Law, first published in 1836, went through many
editions, culminating in the canonical eighth
edition, with notes by Richard Henry Dana, Jr.,
published in 1866. Dana's became the most
frequently cited version, and was selected by the
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Carnegie Endowment for reproduction in its
series on the Classics of International Law.
Wheaton's Elements of International Law
Wheaton's ideas still permeate the
international legal order that they did so much to
establish, but Wheaton himself is largely
forgotten. Mentioned (if at all) only in
quotations from nineteenth-century
court
decisions, Wheaton is seldom read and almost
never cited. Yet no subsequent treatise has
reached the same level of influence as
Wheaton's Elements, and much of Wheaton's
thinking remains embedded in the institutions of
contemporary international law.
Wheaton's
arguments are worth reviewing and evaluating
for their own sake, but also for the insights that
they give into the philosophical foundations of
the international legal order.
There has been a tendency among some
recent scholars to exaggerate the separation
between law and morality, even in international
law (see e.g. Alfred P. Rubin, Ethics and
Authority in International Law (Cambridge,
1997). A close look at Wheaton confirms how
late and incompletely (if ever) this doctrine
infiltrated accepted public law doctrine. Just as
lawyers since Cicero had understood that states
should be communities of free and equal
citizens, associated in pursuit of the common
good, so Grotius, Wolff, Vattel and Wheaton
saw international law as supporting a
community of free and independent states,
associated together for justice. The nature and
moral independence of states requires a wellestablished set of laws to govern their
community, just as human nature requires
certain laws to regulate human society. The
measure of both is justice.
This does not mean that people or states
receive justice, unmediated, directly from
nature. They must turn instead to the evidence
of history, public opinion, judicial decisions,
custom and other institutions that reveal justice
through human behavior. Wheaton understood
the value of collective perceptions in clarifying
the details of international law. The Elements of
International Law includes many specific
ASIL 9
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precepts of international legal doctrine,
supported by extensive citations to publicists, to
decisions by various courts, and to other
expressions of human opinion that show where
history, morality and consensus have generated
specific rules of international conduct.
The Sources of International Law
Henry Wheaton identified justice as the
ultimate arbiter of international law (Wheaton,
Elements, 3, 20), making use of those principles
"which sound policy dictates as necessary to the
security of any state"(xv). Europeans first
recognized these maxims through their study of
the canon law and Roman Civil Law, as revived
by Spanish casuists and learned professors at the
University of Bologna. The professors of Roman
law were the public jurists and diplomats of their
age and continued to be so even after the
Protestant Reformation of Europe. Naturally,
such learned men looked to well-recorded
Roman civil law precedents to discover the basic
requisites of justice, and to settle international
disputes (xiv).
The value that Wheaton saw in Grotius and
other public jurists (xvi) is the benefit that he
himself offered to statesmen, by writing
impartially to clarify justice, as revealed through
reason and experience. What Wheaton's treatise
on the "reciprocal duties of sovereign states"
lacked in the force of "positive law", it gained
through the moral sanction of enlightened
opinion, responding to truth and sound reason
(xvi-xvii).
Wheaton's concentration on the
relationship between states might seem at times
to endorse the positivism that he elsewhere so
explicitly rejected (xix), but Wheaton always
measured international law according to "the
principles of justice" which "ought to regulate
the mutual relations of nations" (3).
Wheaton adapted his formal definition of
international law from James Madison, believing
that: "international law, as understood among
civilized nations, may be defined as consisting
of those rules of conduct which reason deduces,
as consonant to justice, from the nature of the
society existing among independent nations;
with such definitions and modifications as may
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be established by general consent." (20)
Wheaton sought specific evidence for the
content of international law from (in order of
importance): first, the writings of publicists;
second, treaties; third, the ordinances of
particular states; fourth, the adjudications of
international tribunals; fifth, private government
archives; and finally, from the history itself, of
how states have behaved in the past, and what
they recognize as justice (20-23). The primacy
that Wheaton gave to publicists, and their views,
in determining international law, depended on
their impartiality, as recognized by statesmen,
and so ultimately on reason itself (20).
States
Wheaton's treatise concerns states, and their
mutual relations (25). States, in this context,
constitute separate political societies, supreme in
their own spheres, and independent from the rest
(27, 44). Wheaton posited a "great society" of
states, with determinate rights and duties
between them (28). Membership in this society
depends on mutual recognition (29), with
sanctions enforced by opinion (77). But the
fundamental rights, which all states enjoy with
regard to each other, derive from their separate
existence as independent moral beings.
Wheaton calls these basic rules the "absolute"
international rights of states (75). There are also
"conditional" rights, derived from particular
conditions and circumstances (75).
The "absolute" rights of states include selfpreservation, self-defense, peaceful expansion,
peaceful internal development (75-77), and all
the other ordinary processes of self-realization,
naturally due to independent moral actors, living
in a "state of nature" (77). International law
depends for its efficacy entirely upon "moral
sanctions", not including the resort to arms,
except in exceptional circumstances (77-78).
Wheaton hesitated to articulate the particular
conditions
of any
specific
"right to
intervention," for fear that states would abuse it,
as a pretext for invasion (79). He approved
Britain's vigorous resistance to any overarching
world government, which might superintend the
internal affairs of other states (80). This policy
of non-interference extended to protecting the
AS1L 9

independence of Spain's former American
colonies, which Wheaton approved (81).
Wheaton supposed that the principles of
international law might sometimes justify
interference to support wars of national
liberation "when the general interests of
humanity are infringed by the excesses of a
barbarous and despotic government" (95) or the
"general peace" and "balance of power" are
threatened (98-99). This despite every state's
right "as a distinct moral being" independently
to alter or abolish its own municipal constitution
of government (100), without the interference of
others (103).
The difference here lies in
Wheaton's distinction between "barbarous' and
"civilized"
governments.
"Civilized"
governments, established for the good of their
own citizens, enjoy a right to autonomy which
"barbarous" governments, acting despotically to
dominate and exploit their own subjects, do not
(97).
This illuminates the circumstances in which
independent states may properly enforce the
universal law of nations. Wheaton suggested
(for example) that piracy was a crime by the
universal law of nations, while slavery was not
(174).
The "general, ancient and admitted
practice" of states, their treaties, and various
transactions of civilized nations had once
accepted slavery and the slave trade. To make
these crimes "by the universal law of nations"
Wheaton required a treaty, or universal change
in state practice (174, 177). Notwithstanding
that the slave trade was, as John Marshall
observed (and Wheaton admitted), "contrary to
the law of nature", nonetheless the enslavement
of those defeated in lawful wars was an ancient
practice, still widely recognized in Africa, where
many European states had been willing to
purchase slaves. Universal practice and opinion
had once supported the slave trade and so
(Wheaton supposed) must the law (.178-179).
Jurisdiction
The law of nations, as recognized in
Wheaton's day by "all civilized and commercial
states throughout Europe" was in part unwritten,
and in part conventional. Wheaton sought the
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unwritten law first "in the great principles of
reason and justice", but then also in the judicial
decisions of various tribunals in every country,
which tend to make the unwritten law more
"fixed" and "stable" (356). The mutual
independence of states leaves them without any
common arbiter or judge, and so each must, in
the end (of necessity) become a judge for itself
against the others, whenever they disagree (309).
The rules of law that Wheaton laid down tried to
restrain this discretion to the "clear and open
denial of justice" (310).
Wheaton understood that older and less
humane rules of international conduct had
gradually been replaced by newer and better
principles, when publicists such as Grotius and
Vattel articulated new standards. The law of
nature often supplies a rule (such as
proportionality) which publicists and practice
make more complete (359). This "progress of
civilization" (as Wheaton recognized) was not
complete in his own time (378), despite the
efforts of enlightened statesmen (380), nor is it
now. In many cases, justice fails from an
absence of reciprocity. For one state,
unilaterally, to embrace the just rule, might leave
it defenseless against the others (391). When
one state exercises its jurisdiction unjustly, to
harm another's nationals, Wheaton understood
that the second state may respond with reprisals,
to prevent "the denial ofjustice" (409).
Wheaton explained that the jurisdiction to
legislate and to enforce the law in each separate
and independent state properly extends
throughout that state's own territory, to its own
nationals (wherever situated), to offences
committed on its vessels on the high seas, and
"to the punishment of piracy, and other offences
against the law of nations, by whomsoever and
wheresoever committed" (151, 161). Regarding
pirates and other international criminals (458),
Wheaton believed that since these are "common
enemies of all mankind," all nations have an
equal interest in their apprehension and
punishment (162). Wheaton did not accept that
the international law of his period extended to
the punishment of ordinary murders on the high
seas (164) or to preventing the African slave
trade (165-167), except as between nations that
ASIL *

had mutually agreed to do so (173).
Here Wheaton's commitment to "reason"
and to "nature" gave way to a positivistic
doctrine of previous consent. When states had
first consented to the slave trade, a right had
vested, such that states could not now withdraw
their consent, to reflect their new sense of justice
(179). Wheaton elsewhere accepted that "the
progress
of civilization"
can
change
international law to support "the serious interests
of mankind" (195-196), so Wheaton's views on
slavery stand revealed as products of his own
moral blindness. His position would seem to
have been that once universal consent has
recognized the justice of a doctrine of universal
international law, that doctrine may not be
superseded, except by subsequent universal
consent.
Conclusion
The
relationship between Wheaton's
fundamental principal of international law
("justice") and his subsidiary
measure
("consent") (20), depends on a belief (borrowed
from Grotius) that justice itself requires good
faith, even in war (416). Thus treaties and
agreements become binding, even when unjust,
through the underlying moral obligation to keep
one's word (with certain obvious exceptions)
(40-41,292). Wheaton accepted a doctrine of
"moral impossibility," which sometimes limits
this binding influence of treaties. "Moral
impossibility" arises when fulfilling a treaty
engagement would injure third parties (281).
Coerced consent also voids treaties, because
coercion violates justice (284).
The value of Wheaton today lies less in the
specifics of his explanation of international law
as it existed in his day, than his underlying
conception of where law comes from, and the
purposes that law serves. If international law
consists in "those rules of conduct which reason
deduces, as consonant to justice, from the nature
of the society existing among independent
nations," (20) then the justice and nature of this
international society will merit close attention.
Wheaton's work should remind contemporary
scholars of international law that there can be no
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law without justice, no justice without
community, and no international community
without reflection about the underlying purposes
that all states exist to serve.

HISTORICAL
AND
RELATIVITY
THE
PERSPECTIVE OF THE GOLDEN AGE OF
INTERNATIONAL LAW

I.

The greatest weakness of Wheaton's
Elements lies in his overwhelming commitment
to states as the sole subjects of international law.
States provide a useful vehicle for codifying and
enforcing the international law, but not at the
expense of individual justice (as Wheaton
himself admits). The strong analogy made in
liberal international law from Grotius to
Wheaton between the liberty and equality of the
individuals within the state, and the liberty and
independence of the state within international
society, breaks down when states deny their
citizens' rights at home. Wheaton's commitment
to justice of international society offers a vehicle
for correcting despotic states. His emphasis on
"civilized" values disparages "barbarism" and
injustice.
Wheaton's distinction between "civilized"
and "barbarous" nations lies at the heart of his
practical legacy. Both terms seem crude and
impolitic to modem sensibilities, but they
capture important truths about the structure of
international society, still recognized in the
Statute of the International Court of Justice
(Article 38(c)). Not all states deserve a place in
the community of "civilized" nations, because
not all states meet the minimum requirements of
justice. Standards of membership can and should
rise, as enlightenment advances -- which it has
since the twelfth century on the basis of a
civilian tradition, derived from Rome. Wheaton
understood the purposes of international law
better.than many contemporary lawyers, but also
its nature and sources. "Le droit international,
ou droit des gens positif,estfond6 sur la morale
internationale,qu 'on a ordinairementappelke le
droit des gens naturel" (Wheaton, Elements, xi)
(Preface to the 1848 edition).
Mortimer Sellers
University of Baltimore
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Introduction

Nicholas Onuf's well-written lead article,
"Henry Wheaton and the Golden Age of
International Law", sparked my interest in
writing this essay, not so much as a comment of
Onuf's, but as a supplementary and free-style
study of the idea of such golden age. At the
outset, I find it interesting that my experience
bears some similarity to Nicholas Onuf's: we
can both trace ourselves to someone famous in
our field. One of my former favorite law
teachers at Peking University Law School was
Professor (and now Judge Emeritus) Wang
Tieya, who, in the 1930s, studied international
law under, among others, Hersh Lauterpacht,
who, in turn, had been a student of F.L.
Oppenheim's. While an LL.B. student (19791983), I read, mostly on my own, a good portion
of Kelsen's Principlesof InternationalLaw ( 2 d
ed.), Brierly's The Law of Nations (6th ed.),
Akehurst's
A Modern Introduction to
International Law (3 rd ed.), Starke's An
Introduction to InternationalLaw (7h ed.), and
more importantly Oppenheim's International
Law (7h and 8th eds.), although I hardly
consumed them well due to my language barrier,
not to mention reading them "from cover to
cover." I must admit, though, that Wang's and
Oppenheim's overall positivist approach had a
great deal of influence upon my subsequent
study and teaching of international law.
It is not totally clear whether the assertion
that the 19'h century was the "golden age of
international law" covers the entire nineteenth
century solely or more or less that period; nor
whether such "golden age" refers to the positive
growth of international law (i.e., the "law" of
nations per se) or to the doctrinal development
of international law (i.e., the science of
international law). Indeed,
it is even
questionable, as Professor Onuf observes,
whether there is sufficient support for this
assertion. Nevertheless, I am inclined to
preserving the above assertion by attaching new
or clarified meanings to the "golden age" from
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